Volume 37
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 37,
1932-1933
6-1-1933

The Constitutionality of Banking Relief Measures
C.M. Strouss

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
C.M. Strouss, The Constitutionality of Banking Relief Measures, 37 DICK. L. REV. 275 (1933).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol37/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The agreement of compromise must be complete in itself and not a mere plan looking to future adjustment of
details.20

The agreement should be in writing, signed and

sealed by all the parties in interest; it should be designated
as a "family agreement"; it should contain a recital of
events leading up to the agreement and the purpose to be
effectuated; a statement that all the debts of the testator
have been fully paid and satisfied; and that the settlement is
based upon a "valuable consideration"; it should recite that
it is intended to be a full, final and immediate settlement of
all matters in controversy.
In the construction of these agreements the courts will
seek the real intention of the parties. 21 If the estate consists of real property have the agreement acknowledged by
the parties and recorded in the office of the Recorder of
Deeds of the county wherein the property is situated.
Even though such agreement be executed, the heirs must
see that an appraisement is made of the property and an
inventory filed in the office of the Register so that the Death
Transfer tax may be properly assessed.
Leo F. Dodson.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKING
RELIEF MEASURES
Within the past few months almost all of the states
have taken drastic steps for the relief of banks. Supplementing these steps was the Couzens Resolution in the recent Short Session of Congress providing for concurrent
action as to national banks by the Federal Comptroller of
the Currency. The decree by President Roosevelt on
March 5th closing all banks throughout the country climaxed
these relief measures. The question has been asked, "What
is the source of authority for these legislative and executive
acts?"
21Cocker's Estate, 1 Dist. Rep. 158 (1892).
20
Wister's Appeal, 180 Pa. 484 (1876).
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The "bank holiday" has been accomplished in a variety
of ways. In some states the banks were closed by executive decree; in others, by emergency legislation; in others,
while banks were not closed, withdrawals of deposits were
limited. Finally, the Proclamation of President Roosevelt
was an executive decree, differing from the decrees of the
governors of the several states in that the former closed
state banks as well as national banks.
The following relief measures have affected banks in
Pennsylvania:
1. The Resolution of February 27th of the Pennsylvania Legislature' authorizing the Secretary of
Banking not to take possession of any banking institution because of the decision of such institution
not to meet in full its liabilities for deposits. (Thus
allowing banks to limit withdrawals.)
2.

Senate Bill No. 527 (The Sordoni Bill) approved
by the Governor March 8, 1933, which was passed
to more fully effectuate the Resolution of February
27th.

3.

Proclamation of Governor Pinchot of March 4th,
closing Pennsylvania state banks on Saturday and
Monday, March 4th and 6th.

4.

The Couzens Resolution passed by Congress during the week of February 24th which gave the
Federal Comptroller of the Currency authority to
regulate national banks in a given state in the same

1Resolved (if the House of Representatives concur), That the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of Banking not to take possession of any banking institution under
the supervision of the Department of Banking of this Commonwealth
because of the decision of such institution not to meet in full its liabilities for deposits made prior to the passage of this resolution or prior to
any future date fixed by such institution, if such institution shall have
accepted such terms as the Secretary of Banking shall have imposed,
which terms shall include the segregation of new deposits in a separate
fund available for withdrawal without limitation by the depositors making such deposits and invested only in liquid assets.
Further resolved, That this resolution shall be effective immediately upon its approval by the Governor.
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5.

manner in which that particular state regulated its
own state banks.
The Proclamation of President Roosevelt of March
5th which closed all banks, national and state, and
placed the regulation of all in the Secretary of the
Treasury.

The Resolution of February 27th of the Pennsylvania
Legislature was passed for the purpose of avoiding the
necessity of a bank holiday in Pennsylvania. It changed
the existing law of Pennsylvania in that where it was
formerly the duty of the Secretary of Banking to close banks
which could not meet their obligations, the Secretary of
Banking is by virtue of the Resolution authorized to allow
them to remain open for current business though limiting
the amount of deposits which may be withdrawn. The
Resolution further provided that a bank is not entitled to
this relief until it shall accept "such' terms as the Secretary
of Banking shall have imposed." The Legislature also declared its intention to follow up this Resolution with appropriate legislation. An analysis of the text of the Resolution, and of the Bill of Senator Sordoni, as well as of the
rules prescribed by Dr. Gordon, Secretary of Banking,
which must be accepted by all banks who wish to avail
themselves of this relief measure, discloses that the Resolution and supplementary legislation are for the purpose of
protecting creditors of banks which are insolvent, or whose
solvency is threatened, from preferences in the distribution
of assets. It sets up the machinery for the administration
of the estates of insolvent banks, or banks whose solvency
is threatened, just as our Federal bankruptcy laws set up
the procedure for administration of the estates of insolvent
individuals and private corporations and associations. The
administration of the affairs of an insolvent bank really falls
within the scope of our Federal bankruptcy laws, but because of the peculiar nature of the banking business Congress specifically excludes banks from the operation of the
bankruptcy laws.2 The administration of the affairs of an
insolvent bank is one of those rights over which Congress
2

Section 4, Federal Bankruptcy Act.
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may take jurisdiction when it sees fit, and over which the
state may take jurisdiction in the absence of Federal action.
The constitutionality of the power of a state to administer
the affairs of an insolvent state bank has not been questioned. In normal times when a state bank fails and the
Department of Banking closes it and pro-rates the assets
among the creditors, the depositors are frequently not paid
in full, yet the act of the state is not assailed as being an impairment of the obligation of contracts and thus repugnant
to Section 10 of the Federal Constitution. The act of the
state is no more unconstitutional than our Federal bankruptcy laws, which enable the Federal courts to take jurisdiction of a debtor's estate in certain instances and pro-rate
assets among creditors. Here, again, creditors are not paid
in full and yet we do not regard it as a violation of the
property right of contract guaranteed under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.
Before a bank may avail itself of the Resolution and
of the new Act. it must submit to certain fixed rules as laid
down by Dr. Gordon, Secretary of Banking, and these
rules clearly indicate that the whole procedure is one for
the protection of assets for the benefit of creditors and not
an impairment of the obligation of contracts. For example,
the bank must agree to be bound by the "rules and regulations from time to time imposed by the Secretary," and that
he alone shall determine the interpretation thereof. No
dividends may be paid to stockholders, and directors and
committees are not entitled to fees. New loans are prohibited and all new accounts must be kept completely separate from the old accounts, must be held in cash or invested in government securities, and must be paid in full at any
time on demand. Thus, as to new deposits the bank is really only a trustee or bailee. It has no right to do a general
banking business. The bank must supply monthly or more
often to the Secretary of Banking a complete statement of
the institution's financial condition. At all times the Secretary of Banking has the right to say to what extent withdrawals may be limited. The Secretary of Banking may
compel reduction of expenses and the decreasing of person-
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nel and the salaries of officers and employees. Only old
depositors may make deposits in the new fund, with certain
exceptions. From this examination of the rules it is apparent that the state is not impairing the obligations of contract
but is protecting the parties to the contract. It is practically closing the bank so far as distribution of assets is concerned. It is conserving the assets for the benefit of the depositors. If the bank is actually insolvent, the depositors
will get their proportionate share of the assets just as if the
bank had been closed outright. On the other hand, if the
bank is not insolvent but takes advantage of the relief measure because its solvency has been threatened, the depositors
will be paid in full as per their contracts. At most, the
measure postpones payment as per the contract, (or proportionate share thereof in the case of insolvency) and by
no means can be said to impair the obligation of the contract.
The Resolution of February 27th and the subsequent
legislation does not impair the obligation of contracts any
more than does the prior law which required the Secretary
of Banking to close an insolvent bank. In both instances
the bank is insolvent, or its solvency is threatened, and depositors are required to "stand by" until the assets may be
marshalled and pro-rated. In neither event is the contract
impaired in the sense that the amount due is lowered. The
purpose of both is to prevent a few depositors from being
paid in full to the exclusion of the general depositors. The
official act of a state in preventing preferences among
creditors where assets cannot meet liabilities is not an impairment of the obligation of contracts within the meaning
of Section 10 of the Constitution.
Contemporaneous with the relief statutes of the various states was the Couzens Resolution of Congress passed
during the week of February 24th which gave the Federal
Comptroller of the Currency authority to regulate national
banks in a given state in the same manner in which that
particular state regulated its own state banks. This was
to promote uniformity as well as to protect national banks
from "runs" in districts where the state banks were closed

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
by state action. If the Resolution of February 27th of the
Pennsylvania Legislature is unconstitutional, regulation of
national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency under
the Couzens Resolution is also unconstitutional, as being a
deprivation of the property right of contract without due
process of law, thus violating the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. Both resolutions are probably valid, however, as neither goes further than to prevent preferences to
creditors of banks which are insolvent, or whose solvency
is threatened.
The Resolution of February 27th of the Pennsylvania
Legislature indicated an intention of the General Assembly
to "enact suitable legislation more fully to effectuate this
Resolution". In pursuance thereof, the Sordoni Bill, (Senate No. 527) was drafted and became law upon the signature of the Governor on March 8th, to be effective as of
February 27th, the date of the Resolution. The preamble
of the Act is as follows:
"Whereas- the stress of economic conditions
throughout the country has resulted in the closing of
many banking institutions with resultant loss to the
depositors thereof, and,
Whereas the moratoria declared in other jurisdictions and the widespread fear of further loss is causing
certain depositors in banking institutions in this commonwealth to seek a preference by abnormally withdrawing funds therefrom, thereby threatening the
closing of such institutions with attendant disaster to
the remaining depositors and the community generally,
and,
Whereas in order to insure fair and impartial
treatment of all depositors to the preference or prejudice of none and to safeguard the banking institutions of this commonwealth ..........
The Act then provides that the Secretary of Banking
in his discretion may extend the period of time deposits of
any bank; he may postpone the payment of demand deposits; and he is "authorized and directed not to take possession of any institution under his supervision for failure
immediately to meet its deposit liabilities ..... . .. This

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
power terminates after six months, but the Governor may
extend it for a period not exceeding two years. The Secretary of Banking is authorized to set up certain, rules which
must be accepted by the banks before they are entitled to
the benefits of the Act.
It will be seen, therefore, that this Act does not impair
the obligations of contract but merely protects assets for
the benefit of creditors in the manner indicated above in
the discussion of the Resolution of February 27th. The
Resolution and the Act may be regarded as one and the
same measure, and taking them with the rules laid down
by the Secretary of Banking, the entire procedure is quite
consistent with the Federal Constitution.
The Proclamation by Governor Pinchot of March 4th
closing Pennsylvania state banks on Saturday and Monday, March 4th and 6th respectively, may be justified on
the same ground. The right to regulate state banks is in
the police power of the state. His act of closing the banks
is no more a violation of Section 10 of the Federal Constitution than the Resolution and Act above discussed.
It
had the same effect and purpose, namely, to conserve assets
and prevent preferences. Whether he had the authority
under the Pennsylvania Constitution is not our question
here. He acted for the State of Pennsylvania and inasmuch
as contract rights were not violated it cannot be said that
the State of Pennsylvania has impaired the obligation of
contracts.
As for the Proclamation of President Roosevelt of
March 5th closing all banks, national and state, and providing for their regulation by the Secretary of the Treasury,
his act was probably valid so far as the violation of the
property right of contract is concerned. The only question
is as to whether he had the authority under the Constitution to close the banks of the nation without some authorization from Congress. It is true that within a few days
after the Proclamation was issued Congress in special session ratified his action. Does this ratification so relate back
as to supply authority for the unauthorized Act of March
5th? Under the law of agency we know that an unauthor-
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ized act may be ratified and that the ratification supplies
the authority which was lacking at the time the act was
done. Whether the President of the United States may be
regarded as an agent of Congress to the extent that an act
such as his Proclamation may be ratified at a later date is
a problem which will not be here discussed. We know
that the regulation of our currency is a Federal problem and
that. where the entire financial structure of the country is in
jeopardy, Congress would have authority under the Consti3
tution to regulate the banks both Federal and state.
Legislative authority for the President's Proclamation
has been based upon the "Trading with the Enemy Act"
of October 6, 1917, which, though passed as a war measure, gave the President sufficient authority to allow him to
close banks. The law was not repealed, and the act of the
President might well be justified thereunder. Even in the
absence of such legislative authority the proposition has
been advanced that the Proclamation might be sustained as
an exercise of an inherent right in the Chief Executive to
exercise extraordinary powers in periods of national crisis.'
C. M. Strouss.

THE PURCHASE MONEY TRUST ACT OF 1901 IN
THE LIGHT OF THE RECORDING ACTS
The Act in question provides that purchase money
trusts shall be void against bona fide creditors, and mortgagees and purchasers of or from the holder of the legal
title unless such takers had notice of the trust.'
8Federal Constitution, Article 1, Section 8. McCulloch v. Mary.
land. (Supreme Court of the United States, 1819. 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L,
ed. 579).
40 Stat. L. 411.
5
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 345, 346; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.
135.

'Section 1 of The Act of 1901. P. L.425; 21 Purd. Stat. Sec. 601
provides: "Whenever hereafter a resulting trust shall arise with respect

